. This is a geographical reference to the Shan and Kachin states where there had been much fighting recently as the military sought to extend its control and consolidate previous gains especially against the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) . And in the Shan states quite a lot of the fighting is between different ethnic groups themselves and in particular between the Restoration Council of the Shan States (RCSS), the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP) and the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA). And most of this fighting is for control over territory in areas with mixed ethnic populations.
The declaration is also viewed as an attempt to lure the three ethnic armed groups that appeared keen to enter the peace negotiations and sign on to the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) earlier after informal talks arranged by China. The three groups are the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Arakan Army (AA). These were the three groups that the military had in the past insisted on a surrender before any negotiations on account of their brazen attacks on border towns in the past.
Unilateral ceasefires are not a new development and in fact the previous government led by Thein Sein announced a similar ceasefire with the KIO in January 2013 in order to try and engage it in peace talks after the collapse of the bilateral ceasefire in June 2011 (Aung Naing Oo, 2018) .
Other than trying to persuade the non-signatories the ceasefire is also viewed as an attempt to reengage the Karen National Union (KNU) the anchor ethnic armed group in the NCA to return to the negotiation table (to be discussed later). There are many other reasons that could have motivated the military. Like the three non-signatories mentioned earlier, the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) is another group that is believed to be close to signing the NCA (Joe Kumbun, 2018) . And the military would like all ethnic armed groups to sign on to the NCA by April 2019 in order to move the stalled process forward. In fact the National League for Democracy-led (NLD) government is also hoping to bring the peace process to an end in 2020 prior to the end of its term in office although this is not to suggest that the military and the government necessarily share the same strategic perspective. The government's strategy also includes changes to the 2008 Constitution that the military is staunchly opposed to. And while there has been a lull in fighting in the north and northeast of the country, the situation in the western state of Rakhine has deteriorated significantly and fighting there involves the Arakan Army, one of the three groups that the military had initially sought to bring into the NCA.
Ⅱ. Arakan Army's new forays into Chin and Rakhine states
The Arakan Army (AA) had been involved in clashes with the military from October 2018 and this is one of the reasons why the unilateral ceasefire was not extended to the Western Command covering the area. The AA had traditionally been headquartered in Laiza in Kachin state together with the KIO. In fact it was the KIO that nourished and supported the AA and the TNLA in order to broaden its engagement of the military. Then in late 2018 the AA announced that it was going to seek a foothold in Rakhine state in order to represent Rakhine ethnics and secure its position as an ethnic armed group with territorial control in areas where its ethnic nationals were dominant. Consequently, it sought bases in Paletwa in Chin state and in the Mayu mountain range in Rakhine state. The military was determined not to allow this relocation and has engaged the AA fiercely to deny it such a foothold.
The flare in violence between the two groups became especially pronounced after the AA attacked 4 border police posts and killed 13 border policemen. In the early stages of the fighting it was reported that hundreds of Chin and Arakanese had fled across the border into Bangladesh as well (Moe Myint, 2019a) . The military was enraged and vowed a strong response to the terrorist-style attacks against security forces likening it to the attacks by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) in August 2017 that led to the clearance operation that resulted in more than 700,000 Rohingya Muslims fleeing across the border to Bangladesh. In fact the military has on a number of occasions accused the AA of collaborating with ARSA and using common staging areas near Myanmar's border with Bangladesh in order to undermine the AA's credibility (Mizzima, 2019) . The military also claimed that it had received instructions from the government to attack and defeat the AA. Since January this year the fighting between the AA and the military has escalated considerably and the AA attacked more border police posts in March and also staged brazen attacks on military camps leading to a large number of casualties (Nyann Lynn Aung, 2019a; Moe Myint, 2019b) .
The AA accused the military of disguising its soldiers as policemen and held it responsible for indiscriminate artillery attacks on civilian areas as it seeks to find common cause with the ethnic Rakhine who have a long history of animosity towards the Bamar majority ethnic group. By March the military reported nearly 100 clashes with the AA in 2019 alone (Nyein Nyein, 2019b) . And in mid-April at the time of writing the military has significantly beefed up its troop presence in the area and has fought pitched battles around the historic city of Mrauk U using fighter aircraft and helicopter gunships akin to the situation when it previously engaged the KIO in order to take control of strategic high ground around Laiza. The death toll has mounted steadily on both sides and there are now more than 26,000 internally displaced persons in this new theatre of conflict. The AA and locals have accused the military of summary arrests and killing of civilians as well as indiscriminate aerial bombing of the area. The heightened fighting has led the military to declare a curfew order in five townships in northern Rakhine and there are fears that the situation will deteriorate further (Moe Myint, 2019c) . The order includes curfew from dusk to dawn that makes it difficult for civilians to go about their daily lives including procuring food and medicine. Moreover the AA has detained 8 construction workers and destroyed vehicles and equipment in Paletwa in Chin state accusing the workers of being soldiers in disguise. The stalled construction work for the Paletwa-Mizoram Road is part of the larger Kaladan Project that is meant to link Myanmar and India through land and sea routes and the military was quick to villainize the AA for its actions (Chan Thar, 2019a).
The Rakhine situation has its own dynamics and is somewhat different from that of many of the other armed groups. Firstly, as mentioned earlier, Rakhine state that was in the past home to its own kingdom has a long history of past socio-cultural achievements and the local population is understandably proud of it. Additionally they distrust the Bamar majority as well as the military that they regard as oppressors. In fact it may be remembered that Rakhine, together with the Shan state, are the only two states where the NLD did not secure a majority in the local legislature but since the constitution privileges the President in the appointment of Chief Ministers, the current Chief Minister, Nyi Pu, there is an NLD appointee and there have already been several apparent attempts on his life. This structural arrangement is viewed as continuing oppression from the central government regardless of local electoral outcomes. And to make matters worse, two leading Rakhine personalities (a political leader and a writer) have recently been sentenced to lengthy 20-year prison terms for high treason and incitement deriving from a public speech made during a ceremony marking the fall of the Rakhine Kingdom to the Konbaung Dynasty where they allegedly called for secession and offered armed insurgency as an option (Than Hlaing, 2019; Lun Min Mang, 2019) . Both men are held in high regard among the locals and this development has further alienated the government from the locals. There are also reports that many Arakanese are supportive of the AA and view them as potential liberators from Bamar oppression (Lawi Weng, 2019a) . Additionally, the AA and its charismatic leader has also called for a new and independent vision for the state called the Way of the Rakhita or Rakhine Dream (Kyaw Lin, 2019) . There is a history of such attempts in the past with the Arakan Independence Army (AIA) and Arakan Liberation Party (ALP) for Arakan freedom though both rebel groups collapsed in 1967.
This new theatre of conflict in the west has also strained the government and military's relationship with the other ethnic armed groups. At a meeting between the National Reconciliation and Peace Centre (NRPC) and 8 ethnic armed groups, many of them from the Northern Alliance, it was reported that the government's chief negotiator, U Tin Myo Win indicated that the government will take steps to prevent the AA from setting up a base in Rakhine state (Htoo Thant, 2019) . The TNLA has even warned the military that if it does not stop "war crimes" in Rakhine state it will fight alongside the AA and against the military (Lawi Weng, 2019b) . And together with the MNDAA, the three groups accused the military of attacking civilians and destroying historic pagodas. It may be remembered that these are the three groups that the military managed to persuade earlier on in a meeting in Kunming, China to sign on to the NCA. Hence, it now seems like the ongoing situation in Rakhine state has forced a rethink from these groups.
Additionally, all three groups are part of the Northern Alliance that is led by the United Wa State Army (UWSA) that has been planning for a large celebration of the 30th Anniversary of its bilateral ceasefire agreement with the military in mid-April. In fact the UWSA had called for the government to consider crafting the country into a loose confederation of states rather than a federal structure. While this idea has been dismissed the AA has made a similar call and the military has similarly told the AA to give up the idea (Nyein Nyein, 2019b) Meanwhile the Rakhine parliament in February defeated a motion submitted by the military for the state government to win public support for it (Chan Thar, 2019b) . Taking all these negative developments into consideration President U Win Myint has just established a new committee to try and encourage peace and reconciliation in the state albeit the scale and intensity of the violence between the AA and the military seems to be only getting worse (Nyan Lynn Aung, 2019b). The 14 member committee is led by Upper House Deputy Speaker U Aye Thar Aung and his mandate is to lead field visits to the state and after consultations with locals make short and long term suggestions to alleviate the situation. Ⅲ
. Karen suspension of peace talks, Karenni grievances and KNPP's possible accession to NCA In October 2018 the Karen National Union (KNU) announced that it was suspending participation in formal peace talks. This was widely viewed as a major negative development since the KNU that initially signed the bilateral ceasefire agreement in 2012 and then went on to sign the NCA in October 2015 was the largest ethnic armed group among all the signatories.
In fact the relationship between it on the one hand and the military and the government on the other became so cordial to the point that the KNU regularly used to encourage the non-signatories to adopt a positive mindset and sign on to the NCA. Even the government sought the KNU's help in trying to persuade the KIO, the largest of the non-signatories after the UWSA to sign on to the NCA. Among the reasons offered for the withdrawal was the military's continued insistence on the armed groups formal commitment not to secede territorially from the Union and the agreement to a single joint army under Tatmadaw command. In the past both of these conditions had halted progress on the peace process (Nyein Nyein, 2018c) . The erection of similar statues in Mon, Chin and Kachin states have also led to backlash against the NLD government. In fact in 2017 when a bridge was named after General Aung San there were also widespread protests but these appear to have fallen on deaf ears. Such symbols associated with the majority ethnic Bamar are viewed as an affront in the ethnic minority states and areas that often have their own political elite and heroes (Lawi Weng, 2019d) . In fact the military has on a number of occasions prevented the KNU from erecting a statue of its founder Saw Ba Oo Gyi in Karen state.
In order to reinvigorate the stalled peace talks with the KNU and the RCSS and persuade the non-signatories to sign on the government has rekindled its previously successful informal talks to break the ice (Chan Thar, 2019c) . These are typically held in Thailand and often referred to as the "Bangkok process" although the talks are usually held in the northern city of Chiangmai. Similarly, since the end of 2018 the government has attempted to similarly engage the Northern Alliance through such informal talks brokered by China and typically held in Kunming. All groups and in particular the Northern Alliance have welcomed this approach although the surging violence in Rakhine state has the potential to scuttle this initiative.
In fact the KNU has confirmed that it will meet with the government's NRPC to try and resume dialogue in April 2019 (Chan Thar, 2019d) . And there is also an attempt to engage the KIO as part of talks between all three parties to broaden the process as well (Htoo Thant, 2019b) 
Ⅳ. Continued inter-ethnic fighting in Shan states
Fighting has also continued unabated between some of the ethnic armed groups among themselves for control of territory in mixed ethnic areas.
Such fighting is usually between the Restoration Council of the Shan States
(RCSS) which is a signatory to the NCA and the TNLA which is a member of the Northern Alliance led by the UWSA. Sometimes the fighting is joined by the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP) which typically fights alongside the TNLA and against the RCSS. Such fighting which began almost 3 years ago has only intensified and there appears to be little by way of attempts to resolve the differences between these groups through dialogue. And such fighting makes the general situation much more complicated and difficult to resolve since some of the armed groups view each other as enemies as well. From time to time these three groups accuse the military of taking sides during such fighting over territory in order to take advantage of their differences. And the RCSS is typically accused of receiving such support since it is a signatory to the NCA compared to the TNLA for example which does not even have a bilateral ceasefire agreement which is the conditio sine qua non before accession to the NCA. In November 2018, for example, even before the military's unilateral ceasefire announcement, the Myanmar Institute for Peace and Security (MIPS) reported 21 clashes between the military and the armed groups while those between the armed groups themselves numbered 23 in all (Chit Min Tun, 2018) . And since the military's ceasefire took effect this discrepancy has gotten even worse.
Ⅴ. Continuing Chinese attempts to broker peace
China's involvement in the ethnic peace process in Myanmar has also continued. In fact, since the appointment of Sun Guoxiang, Special Envoy for Asian Affairs in 2015 to help broker peace between the 7 ethnic armed groups in the Northern Alliance that are mostly located in the northern Shan states and Kachin state bordering China and the Myanmar government, China's involvement has become much more pronounced. It may be remembered that it was Sun who arranged for members of the Northern Alliance to attend the Second and Third 21st Century Panglong Conference in Naypyitaw from Kunming in Yunnan province. If not for his intervention and persuasion, members of this group appeared disinterested in the peace process. In fact, the UWSA that claims leadership of the Northern Alliance has repeatedly said that since its 30-years old bilateral ceasefire that was negotiated in 1989 following the collapse of the Burma Communist Party (BCP) is working so well there is no need for it to accede to the NCA. And as mentioned earlier, it is now making grand plans to commemorate the event in April 2019.
While there is a sense in which the alliance is a marriage of convenience between parties that are either in a state of active conflict or left to their own devices like the UWSA, the purpose of the arrangement is to seek solidarity and strength in numbers. And since the UNFC no longer performs that function for the non-signatories to the NCA, the Northern Alliance conveniently performs that role. Whereas the government had in the past been dismissive of this collective idea, especially in dealing with the MNDAA, TNLA and the AAthree groups that do not even have a bilateral ceasefire agreement with the government, it has since the start of informal talks late last year come around to the idea (Nan Lwin Hnin Pwint, 2019) .
And this agreement is truly a clear departure from the military's previous position since the Alliance's Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee (FPNCC) has already indicated that it has its own plans and is unenthused with the NCA as currently constituted. This position is also a great achievement for China since the military was never certain about China's motives given the fact that many of the Northern Alliance's ethnic groups are Chinese in origin and conveniently straddle the border between both countries (Lawi Weng, 2018) . That suspicion appears to have worn thin recently and Sun has consistently maintained that China's position is that the Northern Alliance should accede to the NCA and that such a development would be mutually beneficial for both countries in bringing about greater stability and security to the lengthy border areas.
To be fair, it is Yunnan province that is normally forced to play host to large numbers of refugees when fighting occurs in these areas and therefore 
Ⅵ. Government attempts to amend the Constitution
The NLD-led government entered the political arena and campaigned in 2015 with a firm public commitment to amend the 2008 Constitution to deal with clauses that are not democratic in spirit, particularly those privileging the military and its entrenchment in politics. However this process has been hampered albeit there is widespread public support for it. In fact it may be remembered how a few years ago up to 5 million signatures were collected as part of a public campaign to force the issue although it was unsuccessful.
And lately, the government has returned to this agenda through legislative attempts in the parliament and made it a priority item to be achieved by Update on Myanmar's Ethnic Peace Process ❙ 365 2020 when its current term expires. Interestingly, the process has now become intertwined with the ethnic peace process. The argument is that the Constitution as it is currently drafted does not allow for the kind of political federation envisaged by the ethnic armed groups. Accordingly, in order to move the peace process forward the Constitution has to be amended.
In line with such thinking the parliament has appointed a committee to examine amending the Constitution with NLD lawmakers filing a motion for it in the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (bicameral legislature). It was passed by 369 of the 601 members who were present at the session with 17 voting against it and 3 abstentions while military MPs boycotted the vote (Ei Ei Toe Lwin, 2019) . Hence, at least at the formal level a committee has been formed to A month after the Committee was formed, the military called for a press conference and stated that the military would step back from politics when "there is no ethnic armed organization and the country is in peace," signaling that the military does not think this a right time for it to be disengaged from politics (Nyein Nyein, 2019e to their political representation and influence. As to how far this challenge posed by the NLD will actually lead to political violence of any kind is difficult to predict but the military is not known to take challenges to its pride of place in domestic politics lightly. However the situation is still fluid and has not progressed to the point of actual confrontation beyond blunt warnings thus far.
Ⅶ. Likely future issues and trajectories
The ethnic peace process has suffered some serious setbacks since the last 21st Century Panglong Conference. Such setbacks include the suspension of the KNU and the RCSS from ceasefire discussions. The KNU's withdrawal is especially significant since it is the largest of the NCA signatories and anchored the arrangement. Hence how this situation unfolds will be telling on the future of the entire peace process. The military's unilateral ceasefire for 4 months until the end of April is a welcome gesture although it is widely viewed as an attempt to restart a stalled process.
Another positive development appears to be the seeming willingness of the KNPP to accede to the NCA. If the military deals with the KNU and the KNPP well then it will boost the NCA and peace process in general and if it does not, the entire agreement will be under threat. The NRPC's restart of the Bangkok process of informal negotiations has also led to some positive headway although no formalized outcomes other than the endorsement of the process are still visible. And finally, the unknown at the back of all these developments is how the NLD's attempts to amend the Constitution will pan out in the days ahead. As mentioned earlier, the military has clearly indicated its displeasure thus far and how parliament deals with the issue and the military's response in turn has the potential to alter the entire political landscape and should not be taken lightly. In this regard both parties need to exercise good judgement to avoid untoward outcomes that may set back the political progress that the country has slowly achieved thus far.
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